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Abstract

We document the rise in the share of zombie firms starting from the late 1990s in the
US economy across various sectors. We compare multiple definitions used in literature
to identify zombies and discuss how they continue to survive. We find zombies issue
more debt compared to non-zombies. A subset of zombies defined as growing zombies
are able to raise equity too.

JEL Classification: G33, G34
Keywords: Zombie Lending, Subsidized Lending, Profitability

∗
†

Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Email: debamanyudas@umass.com
Isenberg School of Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Email: saurabhroy@umass.edu

1

Introduction

The rise of zombie firms is discussed as one of the possible reasons for the weak recovery and
productivity slowdown in major OECD economies after the global financial crisis.1 In a wellfunctioning market economy, the process of creative destruction requires poorly performing
firms either to become more efficient or exit the market. However, the proliferation of
unprofitable firms that would otherwise exit the market but continue to operate as zombies
has resulted in increased interest in exploring their dynamics.
The rise of zombies is attributed to various reasons ranging from complex bank-firm relationship2 (Peek and Rosengreen 2005, Jaskowski 2015), government forbearance to evergreening
of loans (Peek and Rosengreen 2005, Caballero et al., 2008, Giannetti and Simonov, 2013).
Bank capitalization (Schivardi et al., 2016) and monetary policy 3 (Acharya et al., 2019,
Banerjee and Hoffman, 2018) are other possible reasons that have been put forward in the
existing literature for the proliferation of zombie firms.
Zombies have spillover effects on their industries and on the economy. The existence of
zombie firms can dampen investment and the growth prospects of healthy firms by crowding
them out (Ferrando et al., 2015, Schivardi et al.,2017, McGowan et al., 2017, Storz et al.,
2017, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2018, Acharya et al., 2019). Throttling the growth prospects of
healthy firms is attributed to misallocation of credit to zombie firms (Acharya et al., 2019.)
Healthy firms may not receive as much credit as they would have in the absence of zombies.
The presence of zombie firms has also been associated with depressed prices, increased labour
costs and increased cost of capital (Banerjee and Hoffman, 2018).
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See McGowan et al., (2017), Haldane (2017), Banerjee and Hoffman, (2018), Acharya et al., (2019)
The close and complex Keiretsu structure of Japan has been attributed to have caused Japanese
banks to start the policy of forbearance with financially weak borrowers in order to avoid reporting loans
as non-performing. This technique of evergreening loans created zombie forms that continued to function.
Unimpeded due to government policy of forbearance, primarily to avoid a possible credit crunch and economic
downturn associated with bank failure.
3
The major argument is that post-crisis, an era of exceptionally low interest rates has reduced the
pressure on creditors to clean up their balance sheets and encourage them to evergreen loans to zombies.
Lower rates also incentivize the risk-taking behavior of firms thereby aggravating the problem.
2
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Following the unprecedented surge in the US corporate debt and the pandemic induced
recession, there is a growing need for a detailed study that explores the prevalence and
functioning of zombies in the US economy. Against this backdrop, this paper contributes to
the literature by identifying the prevalence of zombies in the US. The most common method
for identifying zombies is via the detection of subsidized lending (Caballero et al, 2008). More
recently, Mcgowan et al., (2017) and Banerjee and Hoffman (2018) have identified zombies
in OECD economies based on profitability. Nurmi et al., (2020) categorize zombies based on
employment growth in Finland. In this paper, we combine these methods and study zombie
prevalence in the US economy.
We also contribute to existing literature by exploring the various survival and exit strategies
employed by zombies. This helps us better understand their channels of operation. Finally,
we discuss the sectoral distribution of zombies in the US context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the
methods to identify zombies used in this paper, describes the empirical specification and
discusses zombie prevalence in the US economy and across sectors. In Section 3 and 4, we
discuss survival and exit strategies used by zombies respectively. Section 5 concludes the
paper.

2

Identification

The most widely used method for identifying zombie firms is based on the seminal work of
Caballero et al., (2008). To determine whether a firm receives subsidized loans, the actual
interest paid by the firm is compared to the expected interest expense of the highest-quality
borrowers with the same amount of debt. A firm is considered a zombie if this difference is
negative and the firm is rated below investment grade. They first calculate a hypothetical
lower bound for interest payments (r*) that the highest quality borrowers are expected to
pay. This is compared to the interest payment of the firms. The difference between the actual
interest rate (r) and the notional lower bound (r*) is used to identify whether subsidized

2

lending is present. The interest rate gap is defined as
xi,t

∗
Ri,t − Ri,t
∗
=
= ri,t − ri,t
Bi,t−1

If this interest rate gap is negative, the authors identify the firm to be a zombie for that year.
Following Caballero et al., (2008), substantial literature has emerged that identify zombies
based on subsidized credit for Japan (Giannetti and Simonov, 2013), and Europe after the
sovereign debt crisis (Schivardi et al., 2017, Acharya et al., 2019).
The biggest drawback of this method of identification is the underestimation of the true
extent of zombies in an economy. The interest rate gap variable does not account for a
firm taking new loans to repay past loans. Further, during crises, banks might resort to
evergreening their nonperforming assets rather than recognizing losses and reporting the
actual extent of non-performing assets. This has been observed in Nordic economies (Drees
and Pazarbasioglu, 1995), the US during the Saving and Loan Crisis (Akerkof and Romer,
1993), and in developing nations like India (Banerjee et al., 2009) and Chile (Velasco, 1991)
etc4 .
Other methods of identifying zombie firms seek to fill these gaps. One such method uses
interest payment capacity as a metric (Mcgowan et al., 2017, Banerjee and Hoffman, 2018),
categorizing firms as zombies if they have an interest coverage ratio (ICR) of less than one
for three consecutive years. ICR identifies a wider set of firms that are unable to cover
their interest payments with their profits. This method in isolation can include many firms
that are investing heavily and are initially unprofitable. Adding the age threshold allows
distinction between actual zombie firms from young start-ups. Banerjee and Hoffman, (2018)
also discuss a narrower measure of identifying zombies based on expected future growth
potential. Firms are identified as zombies if Tobin’s Q (ratio of their asset’s market value to
replacement cost) is below the median for the sector for a given year.
It is also possible to classify firms into growing or declining zombies based on whether they
expect future growth in employment. Nurmi et al., (2020) categorize firms as declining
4

See Giannetti and Simonov (2013) for a detailed account.

3

zombies if the annual growth rate of employed workers is negative for at least two years
within the zombie period (ICR being less than one for three consecutive years). If this
growth rate is positive, then the firms are classified as growing zombies. In this paper, we
use these three identification methods to compare and study zombie prevalence in the US
economy.

2.1

Data and Empirical Specification

We use accounting data for listed US firms from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database.
We then exclude firms operating in financial services (NAICS = 52) following standard
practice. We restrict our sample period from 1991 to 2018 and to firms that have data for
at least three years in this period. This leaves us with 20,643 firms and 210,608 firm-year
observations. The summary statistics are shown in Table 1.
To identify subsidized zombies, we start with Caballero et al., 2008 and Acharya et al., 2019.
Their classification of a firm as a zombie hinges on the firm receiving subsidized credit from
banks. A firm receives subsidized credit if its interest rate on borrowing is lower than the
rate paid by the most creditworthy firms in the economy. We calculate the interest rate paid
by the most creditworthy firms in two ways. First, we calculate the median of the average
interest rate (total interest expense/total debt) paid by firms with an AAA rating in any
given year. Second, we calculate the median of the average interest rate paid by the top
decile of firms by interest coverage ratio (ICR). The interest coverage ratio is a good proxy
for the S&P rating of a firm and thus of the highest rated firms.
To be conservative, we take the lower of the two interest rates as the rate paid by the most
creditworthy firms in the economy. Given this interest rate benchmark (rtop ) and the total
debt of a firm (Dit ), we calculate the minimum required interest payment of a firm (Rmin ),
Ritmin = rttop ∗ Dit
Next, we calculate the excess interest paid by the firm. Excess interest is the difference
between the actual interest expense of a firm (Rit ) and the minimum required interest pay4

ment.
xit = Rit − Ritmin
Given xit , a firm is classified as a zombie if it meets the following criteria: (i) xit is negative
i.e. the excess interest paid by the firm is negative which implies that its interest cost is
less than that of the most creditworthy firms (ii) it is in the bottom tercile of firms when
classified by the 3-year average interest coverage ratio. For small firms (<$5bn in market
cap), ICR = 3 corresponds to a rating of BB while for larger firms, ICR = 2 is equivalent
to a BB rating (Damodaran). When using the bottom tercile of ICR as a proxy for S&P’s
rating, only one datapoint has an ICR above 3 and 1.2% of the data points have an ICR
greater than 2. Hence, selecting the bottom tercile is a good proxy for a firm’s credit rating.
We call these firms subsidized zombies.
We next identify firms as ICR zombies if they have an interest coverage ratio of less than one
for three consecutive years and are older than ten years. We divide this sample of zombies
into growing and declining zombies. Firms are put in the growing bucket if they have positive
employment growth for two of the past three years, otherwise they are classified as declining
zombies.
Additionally, for all three zombie classifications, a firm continues to remain in the zombie
state until it has an interest coverage ratio of greater than one for two out of the past 3
years.

Dependent Variables We aim to explain the survival of zombie firms, so our main variables of interest are debt issuance, equity issuance, change in assets, and an indicator for
firm exit. All variables are normalized by lagged PPE.

Controls For our analysis, we need to control for factors that affect a firm’s borrowing
decision. We use Tobin’s Q to proxy for investment opportunities and the Kaplan-Zingales
Index (KZ) and firm age to proxy for financing constraints. Tobin’s Q (market-to-book
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ratio) is calculated as the ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value. The KZ-Index is
calculated as
KZ-Index = − 1.002 ∗ (ib − dp)/att−1 − 39.368 ∗ (dvc − dvp)/att−1 − 1.315 ∗ che/att−1
+ 3.139 ∗ (dltt + dlc)/(dltt + dlc + seq) + 0.283 ∗ q
where ib is the income before extraordinary items, dp is depreciation and amortization, at is
the book value of a firms assets, dvc and dvp are the common and preferred dividends, che
is the cash and short-term investment, dltt and dlc are the long-term and short-term debt,
and seq is the shareholders’ equity.
To ensure that our results are robust, we winsorize all ratio variables at the 1% and 99%
levels.

Results In Figure 1, we document zombie prevalence in the US economy. We can see
that the subsidized borrowing methodology identifies fewer zombies than the other methods.
ICR zombie prevalence increased rapidly starting from the late 1990s, declined substantially
during the 2008 global financial crisis and shows an increasing trend in recent years. The
share of total firms classified as ICR zombies has hovered around 15% in the sample. Declining zombies closely mimic the trends in ICR zombies, while we note a relatively stable
proportion of growing zombies, which accounts for roughly 5% of all firms. We also note that
though declining zombies as a share of ICR zombies have decreased in the current decade,
it still continues to remain high constituting around 65% of ICR zombies.
Figure 2 shows the zombie prevalence in the US economy when we add the age and Tobins’ Q
conditions. These criteria reflect the expectation of future profitability as seen by the market.
Adding these narrows the scope of identifying firms as zombies, resulting in a decline in their
share. As can be seen, the trends mimic the trend for ICR zombies.
Next, we look at zombies within a sector to understand their prevalence in various sectors
of the US economy. Figure 3 depicts the proportion of zombie firms for different sectors
using various definitions discussed previously. Almost all sectors show an increasing zombie
6

prevalence. Sectors such as manufacturing, health and services contribute the most towards
the rapid rise of zombies. On an average, the proportion of zombies (based on ICR) is close
to 25% in these sectors in recent years. In telecommunications, we note a decline in zombies.
Segregating the ICR zombies based on employment retention (growing versus declining zombies) also provides some crucial insights. The share of declining zombies is quite high in
the manufacturing, wholesale, and services sectors, accounting for almost 15% of all firms.
However, for the latter two categories, their share is increasing rapidly, particularly after
the global financial crisis indicating a concentration of distressed firms in these sectors. On
the other hand, for health and non-durable manufacturing, growing zombies tend to show a
rising trend in recent years.

3

Survival Strategies

All firms need to generate cash to survive. Since zombies generate insufficient profits to
pay their interest expense (ICR zombies specifically) they would need to generate cash from
non-operating activities. In this section, we discuss the possible survival strategies adopted
by zombie firms to survive. On the asset side, some of the common responses to distress are
asset sale, capital expenditure reduction, and layoffs. On the liability side, restructuring of
debt and raising equity or debt financing are possible.
Figure 4 shows debt issuance as a share of the total long-term assets for both non-zombies
and zombies using different classifications of zombie firms. Zombie firms raise more debt
as a percentage of their assets as compared to non-zombie firms. Thus, over time, zombie
firms become more levered. Although declining and growing zombies follow similar trends,
declining zombies have higher debt issuance as compared to growing zombies after the 200709 crisis. Table 2 confirms the observation from the graph and shows that zombies issue
more debt compared to non-zombies. Subsidized zombies are the zombies that are able to
raise debt from banks at a lower than market rate and we see that they are also able to raise
more debt compared to other zombie types.

7

We find that zombie firms are more levered compared to non-zombie firms (Figure 5, Table
1). After the 2007-09 crisis, as deleveraging has slowed, zombie firms have locked in more
resources, thereby hindering efficient allocation of resources. Even within these, declining
zombies are getting more levered compared to growing zombies indicating that they are more
distressed.
Figure 6 shows that equity raised as a share of assets has increased after the 2007-09 financial
crisis for both zombies and non-zombies, although the ratio is higher for the former group.
One interesting observation is that growing zombies seem to be able to raise equity in the
markets while declining zombies cannot (Table 3). This may be because a firm which is
increasing employment has profitable investment opportunities, which allows them to raise
equity and increase employment.
Distressed firms may sell their assets to survive and zombies are no exception. Existing
literature confirms that asset sales are a common feature of firms in distress. For instance,
Asquith et al., (1994) discuss financially distressed firms that issued junk bonds engaging
in asset sales. Similar results are found in Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) who also argue
that industry conditions are one of the key factors for asset redeployment. Thus, we expect
zombie firms to sell more assets compared to non-zombies. Table 4 confirms this pattern.
We find that zombies reduce their assets when compared to non-zombies. However, this is
significant only for growing zombies.

4

Exit Strategies

In a competitive market, creative destruction results in quick exit of unproductive firms and
allows resources to be channeled to healthy firms. In this section we study the exit rates
of all firms and compare them to the exit rate of zombies (Figure 7). We show that the
exit rate of zombies is higher than the exit rates of all firms. Overall, exit rates have been
declining after the 2007-09 crisis, which is one of the reasons for the increasing proportion
of zombies. While the exit rates of both growing and declining zombies increased between
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2007 and 2010, they have declined in recent years. Table 5 shows zombie exit probabilities
for various categories. We find that for all categories other than growing zombies, the exit
probability is statistically significantly higher than the exit probability of the average firm.
We also document the composition of exiting firms. Figure 8 shows the percentage of different types of zombie firms which exit the market. Declining zombies constitute almost
three-fourths of all the exiting ICR zombies. Even though declining zombies constitute a
higher proportion of ICR zombies, they exit more than proportionately compared to growing
zombies which is indicative of the truly distressed nature of these firms.
Most firms exit the market via acquisitions, bankruptcy, or liquidation. The most common
reason for exit is an acquisition or a merger, which account for 50% of all the exits. This
is followed by bankruptcy (Chapter 11) and liquidation (Chapter 7) which account for 7%
and 3% of all exits respectively. Liquidation is likely to fetch a low price in the market
compared to takeovers. Thus, when firms start realizing their distress (asset sales), exit
via takeovers might help to alleviate indirect bankruptcy costs (Eckbo, 2008). Figure 9
documents the reasons for exit for all firms and finds mergers and acquisitions to be the
most prevalent reason for a firm exiting the market. A similar pattern is seen for zombies
across all definitions.
Since mergers and acquisitions are the most important exit strategy, we explore the composition of firms getting merged or acquired. Figure 10 shows the percentage share of various
zombie types using merger and acquisition as an exit strategy among total exiting firms. Out
of all firms that are either merged or acquired around 15% belong to ICR zombies, while
10% are declining zombies. M&A of zombies seems to follow a cyclical pattern.

5

Conclusion

This paper documents the prevalence of zombie firms in the US economy and explores how
they continue to survive. Zombie prevalence has increased rapidly since the late 1990s,
declining during the global financial crisis and increasing again in recent years. Declining
9

zombies account for a large share of these zombies.
We find that zombies issue more debt compared to non-zombies. Growing zombies are also
able to raise equity from the market while declining zombies fail to do so. In the absence
of sources of external funds, zombies would need to exit the market. We find that the exit
probability is significantly higher for all except growing zombie firms. Declining zombies
have higher exit rates indicating their truly distressed nature. Out of all the reasons for exit,
merger and acquisition seems to be the most common reason for exit.
Following the massive surge in debt levels and the pandemic-induced recession, recent policy
proposals have been directed around state intervention by setting up bad banks to remove
toxic debts from a lender’s balance sheet, injecting equity directly to the business in return for restrictions on dividend payments,5 etc. as well as mass debt forgiveness.6 However,
since increasing zombie concentration is driven by declining zombies in specific sectors (manufacturing, wholesale, and services), debt forgiveness for these sectors may allow declining
zombies to thrive in an environment with lesser competition, adversely affecting both efficiency and employment growth. On the other hand, policies like debt restructuring or state
support might help unprofitable firms in the healthcare and non-durable manufacturing sectors which have a higher proportion of growing zombies. Our study shows the importance
of sector-specific targeted policies as opposed to mass debt-forgiveness policies.

5

See for instance: ECB pushes for Eurozone bad bank to clean up soured loans, Financial Times, April
2020: https://www.ft.com/content/15d17d1d-8e1b-4f84-97b4-b62e6ae8f962
6
See for instance: We’ll need mass debt forgiveness to recover from the coronavirus, New York Magazine,
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/05/coronavirus-debt-forgiveness-rent-mortgage-recession.html
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Table 1: Summary Statistics

Assets
Market Cap
Total Debt
Debt Issue
Equity Issue
ICR
Leverage
KZ Index
Tobin’s Q

Subsidized Zombies
414.59
387.04
9.86
0.26
2.47
-52.97
0.57
1.90
6.00

ICR Zombies
322.53
300.81
10.20
0.26
2.49
-57.50
0.63
2.03
7.39
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Declining Zombies
328.77
219.64
11.27
0.28
2.14
-50.03
0.72
2.28
8.48

Growing Zombies
309.38
464.66
8.18
0.23
3.20
-72.88
0.43
1.53
5.16

Non-Zombies
2144.06
1777.59
3.52
0.16
2.26
12.95
0.30
0.57
3.36

Table 2: Debt Issue by Zombies
(1)
Subsidized Zombie

(2)
(3)
Debt Issue

(4)

0.060∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.021∗∗∗
(0.006)

ICR Zombie

0.014∗
(0.007)

Growing Zombie

Tobin’s Q

0.015∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.015∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.015∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.012∗
(0.006)
0.015∗∗∗
(0.001)

KZ Index

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

Observations
R2
Year FE
Firm FE
Industry FE

119147
0.43
Yes
Yes
Yes

119147
0.43
Yes
Yes
Yes

119147
0.43
Yes
Yes
Yes

119147
0.43
Yes
Yes
Yes

Declining Zombie

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Equity Issue by Zombies
(1)
Subsidized Zombie

(2)
(3)
Equity Issue

(4)

-0.339∗∗∗
(0.102)

ICR Zombie

-0.045
(0.086)
0.752∗∗∗
(0.135)

Growing Zombie

-0.518∗∗∗
(0.077)

Declining Zombie

Tobin’s Q

0.142∗∗∗
(0.008)

0.142∗∗∗
(0.008)

0.143∗∗∗
(0.008)

0.143∗∗∗
(0.008)

KZ Index

-0.003
(0.008)
115509
0.26
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.003
(0.008)
115509
0.26
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.004
(0.008)
115509
0.26
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.003
(0.008)
115509
0.26
Yes
Yes
Yes

Observations
R2
Year FE
Firm FE
Industry FE

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Asset Sale by Zombies
(1)
Subsidized Zombie

(2)
(3)
∆ Asset

(4)

0.101
(1.147)

ICR Zombie

-1.452
(1.092)
-2.186∗∗
(1.068)

Growing Zombie

Declining Zombie

-0.085
(0.711)

Tobin’s Q

1.219∗∗∗
(0.271)

1.219∗∗∗
(0.271)

1.218∗∗∗
(0.271)

1.219∗∗∗
(0.271)

KZ Index

0.104
(0.218)
114615
0.12
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.108
(0.219)
114615
0.12
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.107
(0.218)
114615
0.12
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.105
(0.218)
114615
0.12
Yes
Yes
Yes

Observations
R2
Year FE
Firm FE
Industry FE

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Zombie Exit Probability
(1)
Subsidized Zombie

(2)
(3)
Firm Exit

(4)

0.022∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.031∗∗∗
(0.003)

ICR Zombie

Growing Zombie

0.002
(0.004)
0.030∗∗∗
(0.003)

Declining Zombie

Tobin’s Q

-0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)

KZ Index

0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
121510
0.19
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
121510
0.19
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
121510
0.19
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
121510
0.19
Yes
Yes
Yes

Observations
R2
Year FE
Firm FE
Industry FE

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Proportion of zombie firms using various definitions

Figure 2: Proportion of zombie firms with added criteria
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Figure 3: Sectoral analysis of zombie concentration
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Figure 4: Debt issuance by zombies as compared to non-zombies following alternative
definitions

Figure 5: Leverage of zombies as compared to non-zombies following alternative definitions

Figure 6: Equity raised by zombies as compared to non-zombies following alternative
definitions
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Figure 7: Exit rates of all firms and zombies

Figure 8: Composition of exiting firms
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Figure 9: Reasons for exit

Figure 10: Percentage of exiting zombies out of all exiting firms which are either
merged or acquired
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